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he Bank of Canada has held economic confer-
ences since 1990. These conferences serve as a
forum to present staff research and to exchange
ideas with leading researchers. This year’s
conference was particularly important, since it focused
on some relevant issues that need to be considered as
the Bank and the government prepare to renew the
inﬂation-control targets in 2006.1 Such issues had also
been the theme at each of the conferences preceding
the renewal of the inﬂation-targeting agreement (1993,
1997, and 2000). The topic of price stability, for exam-
ple—its nature, the costs and beneﬁts associated with
it, and the design of explicit targets for achieving it—
recurred at every conference. Previous conferences
also included sessions on such other topics as the real
effects of inﬂation, the effect of inﬂation on economic
growth, downward nominal-wage rigidity, and the
Phillips curve at low inﬂation.2
The 2005 conference revisited two critical issues relating
to the design of inﬂation targeting: price-level targets
versus inflation targets, and the appropriate rate of
inflation. Returning to these issues was worthwhile
for two reasons: improvements in economics and
changes to the Canadian economy. In particular,
advances in structural interpretations of inflation
dynamics, such as the New Keynesian Phillips curve,
1.   In a joint agreement with the Government of Canada in 1991, the Bank of
Canada adopted a series of explicit inﬂation targets.  Currently, the target is
the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI), using the
2 per cent midpoint in a range of 1 to 3 per cent and a target horizon of six
to eight quarters. For more information on the Bank’s inﬂation-targeting
regime, see www.bankofcanada.ca/en/monetary/inﬂation_target.html.
2.   Conference papers and discussions are available on the Bank of Canada’s
website (www.bankofcanada.ca). Proceedings of this conference will be pub-
lished later in 2006.
and recent micro data and survey studies have indicated
that the length of average price contracts is much shorter
than previously thought. Robust control methods now
allow policy-makers to consider the possibility that
their economic model may be incorrect. Finally, ad-
vances in computing power make it feasible to conduct
welfare-comparison experiments in fully specified
dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) settings.
The 2005 conference revisited two
critical issues relating to the design of
inﬂation targeting: price-level targets
versus inﬂation targets, and the
appropriate rate of inﬂation.
TherehavealsobeenchangesintheCanadianeconomy
that argue for continued research into the Bank’s inﬂa-
tion-targeting regime. Inﬂation persistence has dimin-
ished substantially, and the forecasting ability of models
of inflation has thus deteriorated. The volatilities of the
Canada-U.S. exchange rate and some Canadian asset
prices have increased, raising questions about the role
of monetary policy under these circumstances. Finally,
over the course of the 2000s, Canadian interest rates
fell to their lowest levels in more than a generation.
The Bank was pleased to host a notable group of authors
and discussants at the 2005 conference to examine
these and other questions, including inflation dynamics,
asset-price inﬂation, and the communication of mone-
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tary policy. In a departure from the custom at previous
conferences, the Bank invited general discussants, who
spoke, not about specific papers, but more about the
issues of the session as a whole. As well, two distin-
guished speakers gave their perspectives on inﬂation
targeting. Christopher Ragan expressed his thoughts
on the future challenges for inﬂation targeting, while
Frederic Mishkin posed a series of salient questions in
this year's John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture.
Session I: Inﬂation Targeting in
Canada
In his paper, “The Road Ahead for Canadian Inﬂation
Targeting,” Christopher Ragan (Bank of Canada and
McGill University) argued in favour of extending the
current inﬂation-targeting framework.
He began by evaluating the performance of inflation
targeting in Canada. Inﬂation has been stable, averag-
ing close to 2 per cent, and, with few exceptions, has
remainedwithinthetargetrangesincetheBankadopted
the targets. There is evidence that inflation targeting
has acted as a macroeconomic stabilizer, helping to
attenuate the business cycle and to increase economic
growth. As well, monetary policy is credible: private
sector inflation expectations have largely centred on
2 per cent over the post-1993 inflation-targeting period.
Anchored expectations result directly from clear
communication. The transparency of the inflation-
targeting framework has allowed markets to under-
stand better how the Bank reacts to projected economic
outcomes.
Ragan proposed two extensions for consideration:
(i) reducing the inflation-control targets, and (ii) moving
from inflation targeting to price-level targeting. He
conceded that more analysis is required to determine
whether these modiﬁcations to the current framework
would be welfare-enhancing. He also drew attention
to the importance of improved central bank communi-
cation with the public, suggesting in particular that
the Bank reduce its emphasis on short-term signalling
(i.e., giving hints about or providing actual projections
of future policy actions) and increase the amount of
longer-term education (i.e., explaining the reasoning
that goes into monetary policy actions) so that the public
can understand even better than it does now how the
Bank formulates monetary policy decisions. He listed
three areas where public education was needed: the
bluntness of monetary policy, the monetary transmis-
sion mechanism and the importance of lags, and the
effect of oil-price shocks on monetary policy.
Session II: Inﬂation Dynamics
Although the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC)
is often used in the academic economic literature as
a structural model of short-run inflation behaviour,
empirical support for that model has been mixed. The
two papers presented in this session entered the debate
by applying novel methodological approaches to exam-
ine the NKPC’s validity for Canada.
Bergljot Bjørnson Barkbu and Nicoletta Batini
(International Monetary Fund) used a new method
that controls for the effects of non-stationary variables
to estimate the NKPC. They found that the dynamics
of inflation as measured by the Canadian gross domestic
product (GDP) deflator can be explained by movements
in labour’s share, but that the link between these two
variables is not especially robust. Barkbu and Batini
found that their results are sensitive to measurement
of labour’s share (e.g., the treatment of indirect
taxes, the openness of the economy, the degree of self-
employment, and the inclusion of the public sector).
Günter Coenen (European Central Bank) questioned
the ground for expecting a long-run relationship
between inflation, which is a nominal variable, and
real marginal cost, a real variable. He argued that it
may be more appropriate to treat the variables under
consideration as stationary. He also presented empiri-
cal results based on a model of generalized price-setting
using Canadian data, and confirmed the main finding
reported in Barkbu and Batini.
In the second paper, Robert Amano and Stephen
Murchison (Bank of Canada) found clear support for
the NKPC using the Bank of Canada’s measure of core
inﬂation when they employ a general measure of the
real marginal cost (one that allows for a production
function, labour adjustment costs, and an explicit
role for imported intermediate goods) and relax the
assumption of a constant inﬂation target. Their estima-
tion results are consistent with price-contract durations
found in survey data (about two to three quarters) and
with other statistical properties of inflation. The authors
also found an important role for expected inﬂation
relative to past inflation, a result shared by Barkbu
and Batini. Despite these positive results, Amano
and Murchison were unable to explain why inﬂation
persistencehasfallensignificantlysincetheearly1990s,
while real marginal cost has remained persistent.
Jean Boivin (Columbia University) highlighted the
importance of both the more general measure of real
marginal costs and the non-constant inflation target
for generating the results in favour of the NKPC model17 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
of inflation. Boivin suggested that the authors extend
their model by estimating the inﬂation target and the
inﬂation equation jointly.
Although both papers found evidence in favour of the
NKPC, Sharon Kozicki (then Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, now Bank of Canada) stressed the need
for more analysis of the measurement of inflation,
inflation expectations, and marginal cost before con-
cluding that the NKPC is a good structural model of
inflation in Canada. As well, she noted that, while
inflation persistence can be suppressed by monetary
policy with a credible constant inflation target, other
sources of inﬂation inertia remain.
Session III: Asset Prices and
Monetary Policy
Recent debates on asset prices have focused on two
questions. Can large ﬂuctuations in asset prices affect
the real economy? Should inflation-targeting central
banks react directly to asset prices? The papers in
this session studied the monetary policy implications
of (i) border effects3 caused by nominal exchange
rate volatility, and (ii) Bernanke-Gertler-Gilchrist’s
(BGG) model of the “ﬁnancial accelerator”—the mech-
anism through which a large change in equity prices
affects the balance sheets of firms and households, and
hence credit flows, investment, and consumer spending.
Steven Globerman and Paul Storer (Western Washing-
ton University) showed that the volatility of the Canada-
U.S. exchange rate has increased since 1997. They also
presented evidence of an increase in the size of border
effects contemporaneous with the increased volatility.
They argued that inflation targeting may have con-
tributedtolowerexchange ratepass-through, which in
turn led to a decline in the implicit weight that the
central bank places on exchange rate fluctuations,
even if the costs of exchange rate volatility have not
changed. If the costs of volatility have not changed,
the authors argue, then the central bank needs to
reassess the weight put on exchange rate volatility.
Lucie Samson (Université Laval) questioned how
much of the increase in border effects can be attributed
to increased exchange rate volatility and reduced pass-
through, and how much to some exogenous event,
such as an increase in transactions costs. She also
warned against focusing too much on the adoption of
3. Border effects are deﬁned as the differences in common currency prices in
cities on opposite sides of a border that cannot be explained by distance.
inflation targeting to explain reduced pass-through
and increased exchange rate volatility. Low pass-
through, low and stable inﬂation, and high exchange
rate volatility are compatible with models with nomi-
nal-wage rigidity, menu costs, pricing to market, and
noise traders, she noted.
Robert Tetlow (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) added more structure to the BGG
model to enhance dynamic propagation, making the
model more consistent with the data. He used the model
to compute the optimal weight the central bank should
place on stock-price ﬂuctuations in its policy rule. He
also introduced model uncertainty by assuming that
the central bank only knows the range in which the
growth rate of the stock prices lies. He found that a
direct reaction to stock prices in a policy rule that
includes expected inflation reduces inflation and out-
put volatility only marginally. The results broadly
suggest that policy need not respond directly to
asset-price bubbles. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Central
Bank of Chile) noted that the optimal-response coeffi-
cients in the central bank’s policy rule are huge, which
suggests model misspecification. He also remarked
that Tetlow defines a stock market bubble as a change
in stock prices. He suggested that Tetlow should rede-
fine a stock market bubble as a deviation of stock prices
from their fundamental values and use the method of
robust control to allow for uncertainty around those
values.
Policy need not respond directly to
asset-price bubbles.
Philip Lowe (Reserve Bank of Australia) questioned
Globerman and Storer’s hypothesis that inﬂation tar-
geting causes increased exchange rate volatility, since
this did not occur in Australia. He suggested that the
more interesting question is how central banks should
respond to an exchange rate depreciation in conjunc-
tion with a decline in the terms of trade. Inflation
would rise in the usual short-term policy horizon, but
would then fall in the medium term as the negative
effects of the decline in the terms of trade took hold.
In reference to Tetlow’s paper, Lowe stated that he
agreed with the conclusion that the central bank should
not react directly to equity prices, but is less certain18 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
Mishkin addressed his second question by remarking
that ﬂexible inﬂation targeting, the framework where
inflation is brought back to target over a given horizon,
is consistent with stabilizing both inflation and output.
This is the practice of virtually all inﬂation-targeting
central banks. On the question of whether central
bank transparency can go too far, Mishkin argued that
transparency has to contend with the principle of sim-
plicity in communications. Contrary to other positions
in the literature, Mishkin suggested that announcing a
policy path or disclosing the central bank’s objective
function can complicate communication and challenge
the focus on the long-term goals that should prevail in
the conduct of monetary policy.
On the fourth question, Mishkin admitted to becoming
less skeptical of price-level targeting than he was ﬁve
years ago, suggesting that events in Japan might point
to price-level targeting as an important weapon to
combat deflation. In particular, a key advantage of
price-level targeting is its ability to manage expecta-
tions in a deflation by making agents expect high
inﬂation, thus reducing short-term real interest rates.
This, in turn, helps the central bank to avoid the zero
lower bound on nominal interest rates. In the end,
Mishkin advocated inflation targeting during non-
deflationary periods, since communicating an inflation
target is easier then.
A key advantage of price-level
targeting is its ability to manage
expectations in a deﬂation by making
agents expect high inﬂation, thus
reducing short-term real interest
rates.
Mishkin admitted to a complete change of opinion in
regard to the ﬁnal question. Five years earlier, he had
argued for a point target rather than a range, but now
he advocated the opposite and outlined the reasons
forarange.Arangeisflexible,whichmakesitpalatable
to politicians, and simple, which makes it easy to
implement and explain. Finally, welfare comparisons
show that a target range is able to achieve welfare that
is very close to the social optimum with only slightly
higher inﬂation and output volatility.
when it comes to property prices because real estate is
a more important source of collateral for loans than
equities, so a boom in property prices might well coin-
cide with a boom in lending and consumer spending.
He also questioned whether the class of model em-
ployed by Tetlow is an oversimplification because asset-
price bubbles, which may be debt-financed, are assumed
to be exogenous and are not affected by policy interest
rates. He reminded the audience that asset-price bub-
bles may be initiated by favourable supply-side devel-
opments that boost growth and lower inﬂation. In this
situation, an increase in the current interest rate that
reins in a boom might be considered, since the collapse
of that boom may lead to a stronger undershoot of the
inﬂation target in the medium term. Lowe concluded
that central banks would be better off if they were able
to convince the public that the inﬂation forecast is at
the target and that the policy horizon is only one
dimension of inﬂation targeting.
Session IV: John Kuszczak Memorial
Lecture
Frederic Mishkin (Columbia University) delivered
the 2005 John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture, “The Inﬂa-
tion-Targeting Debate.”4 It focused on five important
inﬂation-targeting questions. Does inﬂation targeting
improve economic performance? Is inﬂation targeting
able to stabilize both inﬂation and output? Can central
bank transparency go too far? Would a price-level
target be better than an inﬂation target? Would a point
target be better than a target range?
Mishkin cited statistics and studies that show a positive
relationship between inﬂation targeting and economic
performance. He noted, however, that the positive
relationship is less conclusive than it ﬁrst appears and
showed that the economic performance of non-inflation-
targeting countries such as the United States and
Germany has equalled that of countries that target
inﬂation. He also pointed out that the countries expe-
riencinghighinﬂationmightadoptinﬂationtargeting,
which facilitates a reduction in inﬂation. There is thus
apossibleendogeneitybiasassociatedwiththepositive
correlation between inﬂation targeting and economic
performance. He concluded that the provision of a
strong nominal anchor is an important argument
favouring the adoption of inﬂation targets.
4. This annual lecture was inaugurated in 2003 in memory of John Kuszczak,
a Bank of Canada researcher who died in 2002.19 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
Session V: Zero Lower Bound on
Nominal Interest Rates
Francisco Ruge-Murcia (Université de Montréal)
expanded the expectations-hypothesis model of the
term structure of interest rates exposited by Cox,
Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR 1981) to take into account the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. The
modified CIR model introduced a non-linearity into
the term structure. The key insight of Ruge-Murcia’s
paper is that the non-linear term structure and the lin-
ear term structure offer virtually identical predictions
for the long-term interest rate when long-term rates
are distant from the zero lower bound, but starkly dif-
ferent ones when interest rates are close to zero. In this
way, Ruge-Murcia derived a definition of “close to
zero”: the interest rate is only close to zero when the
non-linear term structure offers a statistically different
prediction for the interest rate from the linear term
structure. Applying this deﬁnition to Canadian inter-
est rates in the past decade, which reached a ﬂoor of
about 2 per cent, he found that Canadian interest rates
were never close to zero.
In his discussion of the paper, Peter Ireland (Boston
College) recalled that when Ruge-Murcia applied this
model to data from Japan in an earlier paper, he found
that Japanese interest rates were close to zero under
his deﬁnition, since the key distinction between Japa-
nese and Canadian monetary policy is that the Bank of
Canada targeted 2 per cent inﬂation, while the Bank of
Japan appears to have targeted zero inﬂation. Ireland
concluded that higher targets reduce the likelihood of
being close to zero. He suggested that Ruge-Murcia
extend his analysis to more than two countries.
Session VI: Welfare Implications
Two papers addressed questions of inﬂation and wel-
fare in general-equilibrium macroeconomic models.
The paper by Eva Ortega (then Bank of Canada; now
Bank of Spain) and Nooman Rebei extended the new
open economy macroeconomic framework to a two-
sector economy, and estimated the resulting model
using Bayesian techniques. In the context of this
model, the authors considered classes of simple
monetary policy rules and asked which ones maxi-
mize economic welfare. Ortega and Rebei ﬁrst consid-
ered the optimal inﬂation-targeting rule, which
responds strongly to inflation and does not respond
to the output gap at all. They then considered a vari-
ety of possible inﬂation measures to target. There is a
key trade-off: while targeting inﬂation in the non-trad-
able sector increases expected welfare more than tar-
geting overall inﬂation does, it also increases
macroeconomic uncertainty. Finally, Ortega and Rebei
looked at hybrid rules, in which both the price level
and the inﬂation rate are targeted. These results are
inconclusive, since welfare is essentially invariant to
parameter changes in these hybrid rules.
Craig Burnside (Duke University) raised two points
in his discussion. First, he expressed some disappoint-
ment that the discussion of optimal rules did not take
place in an environment where commitment can be
problematic, since the ability to commit to a policy
rule can affect the choice of rule itself. Second, he
reminded the audience that the Lucas critique can apply
even to general equilibrium models; if the model is
incorrectly speciﬁed, it is not appropriate to perform
policy analysis. To remedy this concern, Burnside
suggested that the authors conduct a comprehensive
exploration of the business cycle properties of their
model, at both the macroeconomic and the sectoral
levels. If the model is indeed a good representation of
the Canadian economy, the policy conclusions drawn
from it are valid.
KevinMoran(UniversitéLaval)madetwosubstantial
modiﬁcations to the standard, calibrated, macroeco-
nomicpolicymodel.First,heintroducedmoneythrough
the use of a (partial) cash-in-advance constraint, a
specification that allows more flexibility than introduc-
ing money in the utility function. Second, he assumed
that agents imperfectly observe changes in the cen-
tral bank’s inﬂation target and thus must use Baye-
sian updating. In the context of such a model, Moran
investigated the welfare gains of moving from a target
of 2 per cent to zero. Comparing the two steady states,
the gains are substantial, but the learning costs are
also large. Agents perceive that, within one year, the
target has dropped to 1 per cent. Further learning is
much slower; it takes agents almost four years to
believe the target is half of 1 per cent. Eventually,
agents come to believe that the target is zero, but this
learning process lasts a considerable time. The net
welfare gains are positive, even when considering
the possibility of learning, and robust to a variety of
changes in model speciﬁcation, such as habit forma-
tion, wage rigidities, and different speciﬁcations of the
cash-in-advance constraint.
Andrew Levin (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System) noted that the optimal steady-state
inflation rate might not be the same as the optimal
average inﬂation rate if the distribution of macroeco-
nomic shocks was skewed, owing to the presence of20 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
the zero lower bound on interest rates. In considering
such optimal inflation, however, he considered it
important to reflect on credit-channel effects and
aspects of incomplete indexation, whether in wages,
prices, or tax brackets. Levin also asked how well
the models can match historical disinflation epi-
sodes. Finally, he highlighted the role of credibility
and communication for potentially reducing the wel-
fare costs of the transition to disinﬂation.
In his combined discussion of both papers, Vitor Gaspar
(Bank of Portugal) referred to Hume’s (1739) principle
of “no ought from is,” suggesting that while this
principle may not preclude policy analysis in macro-
economic models, it at least urges caution. He was
also concerned about the ad hoc assumption of simple
policy rules in both papers, as opposed to more general
rules that may yield higher welfare.
Session VII: Panel Discussion
In light of the research presented at the conference,
Paul Beaudry (University of British Columbia) dis-
cussed four issues. First, why should a central bank
adopt inﬂation targeting if its objective is to foster a
stable monetary and financial environment that pro-
motes economic well-being? Is inflation targeting the
best policy?  Over the past 15 years, inflation-target-
ing countries have not had markedly different eco-
nomic outcomes (economic growth or inﬂation) than
comparable industrialized countries that do not
explicitly target inﬂation. Therefore, the data suggest
that alternative policies may perform equally well at
promoting economic well-being.
Price-level targeting aids long-term
planning, allowing people to save for
retirement without worrying about
the erosion of their savings owing to
inﬂation.
Second, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of inﬂation targeting as opposed to price-level target-
ing? Inﬂation targeting aids medium-term planning,
allowing people to sign multi-year contracts. But price-
level targeting aids long-term planning, allowing people
to save for retirement without worrying about the
erosion of their savings owing to inflation. Beaudry
suggested that a proper examination of this question
needs to model incentives to plan for the long term.
Third, what level of inﬂation should be chosen as the
target? Is 2 per cent better than any other level? What
are the costs associated with moving to a lower target?
He highlighted a paradox for monetary policy makers.
On the one hand, if the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates is not problematic for a range of inﬂation
targets around 2 per cent, the target could be decreased,
and economic outcomes may improve. On the other
hand, there may be an important role for stasis: if there
is a costly transition to a new policy, it might be best to
retain the present policy.
Finally, Beaudry asked how an inﬂation target should
be implemented. The most common way to achieve
the target is via a feedback rule that speciﬁes how to
adjust interest rates in response to different economic
outcomes. Inﬂation and output are the usual elements
included in a feedback rule (a Taylor rule). A new
question of interest is whether the monetary authority
should react to asset prices. Beaudry acknowledged
Tetlow’s conclusion that monetary policy should not
do so, but he noted that business cycle ﬂuctuations are
mostlydrivenbynon-monetarydisturbances,implying
that the Bank should have a clear position on how it
will respond to non-monetary shocks.
The discussion by Pierre Duguay (Bank of Canada)
centred on two themes: the target and challenges in
meeting the target. On the ﬁrst point, he noted that the
success of inflation targeting in anchoring expectations
and dampening fluctuations should encourage con-
sideration of further progress towards price stability.
At the most recent renewal of the inﬂation target (May
2001), theoretical arguments supported a reduction in
the target rate, but the benefits were difficult to quantify.
Since then, search-theoretic models (by Shi, Wright,
and others) have increasingly been used to quantify
welfare gains under different frameworks. Moran
used a more conventional DGE model. All point to
positive beneﬁts from a lower target. Ragan noted that
the only way to quantify the gains is with a DGE model
with multiple sectors and relative prices. Ortega and
Rebei took a good ﬁrst step in that direction. The chal-
lenge for central bankers is to determine which model
is closest to the real world and to communicate results
clearly to the public and the government.
Duguay agreed with Ragan that long-run price certainty
is too important an issue to dismiss price-level target-
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beneﬁts. The conventional view used to be that price-
level targeting would induce more variability in inﬂa-
tion, output, and nominal interest rates. New studies
show that, when agents are forward looking and
monetary policy is credible, price-level targeting can
lower the variability of inﬂation, output, and the nom-
inal interest rate. When demand increases, the price
level rises above the target, and agents’ anticipation of
prices returning to target raises the real interest rate,
thus helping to curb demand, and ultimately requiring
a smaller reaction from nominal interest rates. The
reverse occurs under a contractionary shock. Price-
level targeting thus allows monetary policy greater
room to manoeuvre without hitting the zero lower
bound. In the case of a supply shock, however, the
trade-off between output and price stabilization
(whichdisappearedundercredibleinﬂationtargeting)
may re-emerge.
The challenge for central bankers is to
determine which model is closest to
the real world and to communicate
results clearly to the public and the
government.
Duguay listed three key challenges for the conduct of
monetary policy: asset-price movements, vanishing
exchange rate pass-through, and reduced inflation
persistence.Onasset-pricemovements,Duguaynoted
Tetlow’s conclusion that, in normal times, monetary
policy had little to gain by reacting to asset prices over
and above their effect on the inﬂation forecast. How-
ever, he felt that Tetlow did not fully address the ques-
tion being debated in central banking circles, namely,
whether to allow for a longer horizon to meet the target
when faced with a “non-fundamental” asset-price
shock. Given our limited ability to forecast beyond
18 months and to foretell the bursting of a bubble, he
concluded that it would be imprudent to trade off the
achievement of the inﬂation target over a six-to-eight-
quarter horizon for a possible better outcome later.
Duguay then remarked on vanishing exchange rate
pass-through:GlobermanandStorerpointedtogrowing
intrafirm and intraindustry trade as sources of reduced
pass-through, given that exchange rate ﬂuctuations
have offsetting effects on revenues and costs of ﬁrms.
This could also explain the increased variability of
exchange rates: larger variations are needed to achieve
required reallocations of resources if some sectors are
insulated from exchange rate movements. Duguay
asked whether there is a link between lower pass-
through ofother cost increases (energy, raw materials)
and increased variability of relative prices now that
inﬂation is under control.
On reduced inﬂation persistence, Duguay argued that
the main breakthrough in the NKPC literature is an
acknowledgement of the roles played by central bank
behaviour and agents’ learning in affecting inﬂation
persistence. Duguay opined that the puzzle noted by
Amano and Murchison, that there is much lower per-
sistence of inflation than marginal cost, raises questions
about assumptions underlying the construction of the
marginal-cost variable. Amano and Murchison’s NKPC
can outperform other popular models for forecasting
inflation; however, extracting “deep parameters”
requires arbitrary manipulations. It may be premature
to conclude that the Bank has good models of inflation.
Finally, Duguay noted that the NKPC framework
misses the central relationship between demand
pressures and wage growth, a point acknowledged
by Barkbu and Batini.
Peter Howitt (BrownUniversity)dividedhisdiscussion
into two parts: What have we learned? and What have
we yet to learn? On the first question, Howitt began
by noting that inflation stabilization has not been
destabilizing for economic activity. He pointed out
that Ragan’s paper showed that real output variability
has declined during the period of inﬂation targeting in
Canada. Output variability has also declined in the
United States and other countries that have stabilized
inflation, despite the absence of explicit inflation targets.
Howitt would have expected this to be the case only if
most of the shocks were demand shocks. If supply
shocks are dominant, then they are less important
than real-business-cycle theorists claimed. Another
possibility is that an inflation-targeting regime is
inherently stabilizing and mitigates the trade-off
between output and inflation variability in the face
of supply shocks. Anchoring inflation expectations
allows an economy to absorb negative supply shocks
without a round of wage and price increases. The fact
that so many countries share similar experiences shows
that stabilizing inflation at a low rate has a smaller
adverse real effect than originally predicted. Inﬂation
targeting may even be the best way to promote stable
growth.
Amano and Murchison showed that the fall in persist-
ence began at the start of inflation targeting, even22 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
though the persistence of real marginal cost did not
decline. This suggests a change in the process of form-
ing expectations. It appears that, since targeting has
anchored expectations and hence dampened the effect
of shocks, the central bank can afford to take a more
accommodating approach to supply shocks without
unwanted movement in inﬂation.
As well, the exchange rate can be left alone, since
exchange rate movements need not undermine inflation-
targeting policy. There have been large ﬂuctuations in
the Canada-U.S. exchange rate since 1991, without
derailing policy. Globerman and Storer point out that
exchange rate pass-through, which has been historically
slow and gradual in Canada, has become even more
so under inﬂation targeting. This again suggests well-
anchored expectations.
The exchange rate can be left alone,
since exchange rate movements need
not undermine inﬂation-targeting
policy.
Finally, the success of policy has as much to do with
communication and politics as with economics. Com-
munication is facilitated by the clarity of the inﬂation-
targeting framework, as emphasized by Ragan. Com-
munication sharpens expectations. It also helps to
make policy changes transparent, boosting credibility.
When news arrives, private agents understand that
the policy changed because of new information, not
because of a surreptitious change of course. Politics
plays a role, since the government had to agree to
inﬂation targeting. However, inﬂation targeting gives
the Bank a degree of independence, which adds to its
credibility. Howitt remarked that this is why central
banks that adopted inﬂation targeting were those that
had been the least independent.
Howitt then reﬂected on what we have yet to learn. It
is not clear why inflation targeting works. Why have
expectations become anchored? Why has persistence
fallen? Although dynamic stochastic general-equilib-
rium (DSGE) models are being developed to answer
this question, unresolved issues linger. Kozicki noted
that the least well-developed or most ad hoc elements
of most DSGE models are persistence issues (e.g.,
indexation, rule-of-thumb, and habit persistence).
“Learning” may be a fruitful avenue to generate
persistence, but the literature on learning in DSGE
models is still in its infancy.
The next question is, how do we ﬂy blind? How does
a central bank formulate policy without good indicators
of inﬂation pressure? Policy that efﬁciently stabilizes
inflation six to eight quarters from now makes inflation
per se orthogonal to information six to eight quarters
earlier. The Bank must act without the beneﬁt of feed-
back, so it may be the case that the Bank will not see
an inﬂationary spiral immediately. It may also be the
case that if expectations are really stuck at 2 per cent,
monetary policy should take advantage of this inertia.
It has been difficult to find convincing evidence that
reducing inflation below double-digit levels yields
significant benefits. “Shoe-leather” costs were never
quantitatively signiﬁcant in a world that counted non-
interest-bearing money as a small fraction of wealth.
The advantage of DSGE models is that money is not
merely a store of value but plays a role in the pricing
process: money magnifies the wedge that arises
between the marginal rates of substitution through
the random timing of price changes. Ortega and
Rebei, however, showed that even this friction does
not produce very large welfare losses. Howitt pointed
to other important frictions in the economy, such as
the non-indexation of long-term debt contracts as a
source of signiﬁcant cost. Non-indexation allows inﬂa-
tion to impede otherwise mutually beneficial contracts,
such as those for long-term investments. More work
is needed on the role played by non-indexation of
the tax and accounting systems. More real-world mon-
etary economics is needed in models before quantify-
ing the beneﬁts of targeting lower inﬂation.
Conclusions
Despite the many issues raised in the presentations
and discussions, three general conclusions could be
drawn from the conference. The ﬁrst, and most promi-
nent, is that the current system of inflation targeting
seems to work well. Nevertheless, some papers pre-
sented at the conference provided evidence to support
changes to Canada’s current inflation-targeting regime.23 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • SPRING 2006
The second conclusion is that communication is
important, but should be kept simple. Third, there
are still several issues related to inflation targeting
that require further work. Although promising results
have recently been reported concerning the potential
beneﬁts of price-level targeting, how monetary policy
should react to asset prices, and the advantages of a
lowering of the inﬂation target, it is not yet at a point
where any deﬁnite policy prescriptions or signiﬁcant
changes to the present inﬂation-targeting framework
can be put forward. Nevertheless, the evidence is
encouraging and will no doubt lead to additional
refinements in our understanding of the macroeconomy
and our monetary policy framework in the future.
The evidence is encouraging and will
no doubt lead to additional
reﬁnements in our understanding of
the macroeconomy and our monetary
policy framework in the future.
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